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Many consumers have learned to delay purchases, anticipating that prices might decrease. Such strategic
or forward-looking behavior has attracted increasing attention from various disciplines, including operations
management, marketing, and economics. However, there is currently no empirical evidence of the extent
to which this strategic decision-making actually takes place. Combining two unique data sources from the
air-travel industry (posted fares data and booking data), we use a structural model to estimate the fraction
of strategic consumers in the population, assuming different levels of sophistication in consumers’ perception
of future prices: perfect foresight and rational expectations. We find that 4.9% to 44.9% of the population
are strategic across markets, measured by the 5th and 95th percentiles. Using a non-parametric approach,
we further find that most strategic consumers arrive either at the beginning of the booking horizon or close
to departure. Finally, our counterfactual analysis shows that, contrary to conventional wisdom, the presence
of strategic consumers does not necessarily hurt revenues. Rather, the impact varies by market — more
likely to be negative on business markets, and positive on leisure markets. As a result, commitment to a
non-decreasing pricing strategy benefits business markets but not leisure markets. Among markets benefiting
from this pricing strategy, the median revenue improvement is 3.5%, and the quantiles are 1.8% and 5.6%.
1. Motivation
When was the last time you passed on an immediate purchase to wait for a sale? This can be
a smart choice as inter-temporal price fluctuations are common across industries: fashion items
are marked down several times towards the end of the season; storable goods are periodically put
on sale; prices for high-tech gadgets with short life cycles dip soon after release; airlines, hotels,
car rentals and theaters regularly revise prices or launch promotions. Of course, there are also
consumers who do not strategize over the timing of purchase simply because they are not aware of
the possibility that price decreases, have high waiting costs, or are not willing to forgo immediate
gains in exchange for uncertain future gains. We will refer to strategic or forward-looking consumers
as those who maximize long-run utility by strategically timing their purchases to obtain lower
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prices. We also refer to myopic and non-strategic consumers as those who maximize immediate
utility and hence do not exhibit strategic behavior.
Studying strategic consumer behavior is important for several reasons. First, very little research
to date provides direct and rigorous evidence of such behavior, relying instead on anecdotal
accounts. Empirical evidence of strategic consumer behavior would not only enrich our knowledge
of consumer behavior but also improve managerial decisions, such as pricing and inventory man-
agement. Second, most current demand forecasting models, including those used in airline revenue
management systems, assume that consumer arrivals are exogenous and inter-temporally inde-
pendent. However, correctly incorporating inter-temporal demand substitution may improve the
accuracy of demand forecasting. Finally, revenue implications of strategic consumers could be sig-
nificant. The common belief is that the presence of strategic consumers shifts demand from high to
low prices, thus hurting revenues, but the extent of this effect is unclear: how to price and manage
seat inventory in the presence of strategic consumers continues to puzzle industry professionals.
The air-travel industry is a particularly interesting test bed to study strategic consumer behavior.
Unlike price fluctuations for seasonal or technological products, inter-temporal changes in airfares
are much harder to predict. It is no longer surprising to learn that the person seated next to you on
a plane paid much less for essentially the same seat. Revenue management, the practice of bucketing
airfares into multiple classes and managing seat inventory dynamically, has revolutionized pricing
(Talluri and van Ryzin 2005, Boyd 2007). Airlines constantly recompute protection levels and bid
prices by taking into account the current number of available seats and latest demand forecasts,
which results in constant opening, closing, and reopening of fare classes. Inventory managers can
also override revenue management systems based on their expertise and local knowledge of demand;
moreover, the pricing department revises fares periodically in response to changes in demand pat-
terns, operating costs, and competitors’ actions. Sometimes, pricing managers will launch temporal
sales, which may trigger industry-wide price wars and further add to price swings. Therefore, even
the same inventory class may not always be priced at the same level. All of this is likely to trigger
fare shopping on the consumer side.
Despite this volatile nature of airfares, consumers are not helpless. Proliferation of web tools,
e.g., major online travel agents (e.g., Expedia, Orbitz), fare aggregators (e.g., Kayak, Sidestep),
and opaque channels (e.g., Hotwire, Priceline) have made it much easier for consumers to compare
prices. Microsoft Bing/Travel (formerly Farecast) even makes a suggestion to “wait” or “buy”
based on the probability of prices going up or down within the next seven booking days. Moreover,
traditional oﬄine agencies, which are often experienced and know the quirks of price movements,
may help consumers obtain better deals in order to increase customer loyalty. Based on our spot
checks of various travel-related online forums, some travelers have reported savings of $20 to $150
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(or 7% to 33%) by waiting for a better deal. Of course, consumers are not always that smart —
there are also cases in which travelers reported that they had to pay more since the price actually
went up instead of going down.
In this paper, we merge two separate data sources to investigate just how strategic consumers
actually are. First, we have collected information on posted rather than transacted prices. This is
important because in order to investigate strategic consumer behavior we need to know not only the
price paid, but also the prices that were potentially available. Second, many industries where one
would suspect strategic consumer behavior have fragmented distribution channels. This normally
limits access to sales information to a few retailers and makes it hard to obtain a complete picture
of prices. In contrast, we are able to utilize booking information from Global Distribution Systems
(GDSs), covering all bookings made through online and oﬄine travel agents.
We use a simple yet flexible structural model to account for the dynamics caused by strategic
consumers. Unlike most other empirical papers which incorporate forward-looking behaviors (e.g.,
Erdem and Keane 1996), our model does not impose the assumption of strategic consumer behav-
ior a priori. We account for both static and dynamic price endogeneity, which cannot be easily
addressed by reduced-form regressions. Moreover, our framework is flexible enough to incorporate
many extensions with respect to consumer behavior, and it allows us to examine revenue impli-
cations through counterfactual analysis. Our structural estimation results suggest that 4.9% to
44.9% of travelers are strategic across different city-pair markets, measured by the 5th and 95th
percentiles. This fraction varies by the time to departure in a non-linear fashion — most strate-
gic consumers arrive either at the very beginning of the booking horizon or close to departure.
Based on the estimation results, we draw important implications for airline revenue management
strategies. Surprisingly, it turns out that the presence of strategic consumers does not always hurt
revenues, since firms get incremental sales from strategic consumers who otherwise would not buy
if myopic. Strategic behavior tends to decrease revenues in business markets but may increase rev-
enues in leisure markets. As a result, commitment to a non-decreasing pricing scheme turns out to
be desirable in business markets but not necessarily in leisure markets. Among markets benefiting
from this pricing strategy, the median revenue improvement is 3.5%, and the lower and the upper
quantiles are 1.8% and 5.6%, comparable to revenue improvements commonly reported (see Talluri
and van Ryzin 2005).
2. Literature Review
It is a common practice to assume an exogenous demand process in traditional revenue management
research (e.g., Belobaba 1989, Gallego and van Ryzin 1994). Recently, however, there is a growing
interest in studying operational decisions in the presence of strategic consumers (see Shen and
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Su 2007, Netessine and Tang 2009 for a review). Several papers have investigated the impact of
strategic consumers on firms’ strategies such as inventory procurement (Cachon and Swinney 2009),
capacity rationing (Liu and van Ryzin 2008), and revenue management (Jerath et al. 2010), to
name a few. One of the key findings from the modeling literature is that strategic consumers may
exert a negative impact on firms’ revenue: Anderson and Wilson (2003) find a 7% revenue loss;
Aviv and Pazgal (2008) find a 20% revenue loss; Levin et al. (2009) find a 1% to 7% revenue loss.
Nevertheless, other papers predict that strategic consumers can have either adverse or positive
effects on seller revenue (Su 2007, Cho et al. 2008).
Despite the burgeoning interests from the modeling perspective, empirical evidence of strate-
gic consumers is scarce and scattered in three streams of related literature. First, in the realm
of revenue management, a few recent empirical papers study consumers’ choices among multiple
products (Vulcano et al. 2010, Newman et al. 2010) but without accounting for inter-temporal
choice behavior. Second, in marketing and economics there is a stream of literature that incor-
porates forward-looking consumer behavior, starting with Erdem and Keane (1996). More recent
papers include Hendel and Nevo (2006) and Nair (2007), to name a few. However, most of these
papers build on the premise that consumers are forward-looking a priori, and the research objective
is to uncover consumer preferences rather than investigate how strategic consumers are. Third,
behavioral economists have long been looking at inter-temporal choices and time-discounting. A
closely related recent work by Osadchiy and Bendoly (2010) reports that 38% of the subjects
behave rationally in laboratory experiments by strategically timing their purchases.
To provide evidence of strategic consumer behavior, there are at least two potential estimation
approaches. The first approach is to estimate a discount factor as a continuous measure of con-
sumer patience (e.g., Levin et al. 2009). There are two difficulties associated with this approach —
identification and computational complexity. In the aforementioned empirical studies of dynamic
models, utility functions cannot be identified (non-parametrically) when the discount factor is not
fixed (see Rust 1994, Magnac and Thesmar 2002). Although parametric restrictions will allow
utility functions to be identified jointly with the discount factor, the computational complexity
usually makes it undesirable to do so. As a result, the common practice is to fix the value of the
discount factor and conduct sensitivity analysis on this value, if necessary. The other approach is
to segment the market into discrete consumer types — myopic and strategic (e.g.,Su 2007), and
to estimate the fraction of strategic consumers. A similar idea has been applied in the latent class
models in the marketing literature (Dillon and Kumar 1994). This approach greatly streamlines
the estimation. Meanwhile, it is analogous to market segmentation and can be easily explained to
and understood by industry professionals, so we adopt this approach.
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Given the difficulty in identifying strategic behavior and the lack of appropriate field data, so far
very little research provides direct evidence of strategic consumers. To the best of our knowledge,
there are only two studies parallel to this paper. Chevalier and Goolsbee (2009) test whether
textbook users are forward-looking by anticipating book revisions. They take the discount factor
approach since the structure of the value function is much simpler in this setting. Another example
is an unpublished paper by Hendel and Nevo (2011), who propose a demand anticipation model
to account for consumer stockpiling behavior during temporary sales and obtain an estimate of
the fraction of stockpilers. Our work is related to theirs as we also look at aggregate data and
the model bears similar structure, but we differ in three aspects. First, the research objective is
different. We start out with the purpose of documenting whether consumers are strategic or not,
while their focus is the inter-temporal price discrimination as a mechanism of market segmentation.
As a result, we ask different questions oriented towards strategic consumers: What factors affect
the fraction of strategic consumers? What if more consumers become strategic? What pricing
strategies may airlines adopt in response to strategic consumers? Second, prices are more volatile
and harder to predict in the airline industry, and hence the existence of strategic consumer behavior
is less obvious. Third, demand is relatively stable over time in their setting, and therefore price
endogeneity is less of a concern. However, in our setting, due to the practice of revenue management,
price endogeneity is an important issue that needs to be properly addressed.
Finally, significant amount of price dispersion (Clemons et al. 2002, Chellapp et al. 2011) and
inter-temporal fluctuation (Etzioni et al. 2003, Mantin and Gillen 2011) has been documented in
the air-travel industry, which likely gives rise to the existence of strategic consumers.
To sum up, our study contributes to several streams of literature. Assembling field data to
uncover inter-temporal choices is a significant challenge due to the level of detail and multiple data
sources required. Our data is unique in this sense because it provides a detailed dynamic view of
daily available prices and realized demand. Moreover, the structural model we propose is simple
yet flexible, and at the same time it is consistent with aforementioned modeling literature, so our
approach can be used to calibrate subsequent models.
3. Data
We use two main datasets with millions of records that provide information on airfares and book-
ings, respectively. First, fares are web-crawled from the major online travel agencies: Expedia,
Travelocity, Orbitz, and Priceline. The dataset contains posted fares over a three-month booking
period before each day of departure for each city-pair market. The departure dates are a random
set of seven weeks including both peak and off-peak weeks in the spring travel season of 2005. On
each booking day, we extract the three lowest round-trip (with seven-day length of stay) fares from
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each online travel agency for each particular market and departure date. A fare record contains:
booking date, departure date, origin and destination airports, carrier, inventory class, fare types,
fare amounts, booking agency, and other details of the itinerary. We have also validated the web-
crawled fare information by matching it with transaction prices obtained from a corporate sponsor
in the same time period (matched with a correlation of 0.860). Second, booking data from the
Marketing Information Data Transfer (MIDT) is obtained from an airline corporate sponsor. It
contains U.S. point-of-sale reservations made in all major GDSs. GDSs distribute a large propor-
tion of airline tickets via oﬄine and online travel agents, accounting for 50% to 70% of all sales in
the U.S., so we are able to ensure that sales information is available for most distribution channels.
Markets are selected based on the largest passenger volume for the airline sponsor while ensuring
wide geographic coverage of cities with large populations. These markets represent about 80% of
market coverage for the airline. The dataset contains the following information on the outbound
leg of all economy-class reservations: reservation date, departure date, origin and destination air-
ports, carrier, inventory class, the booking agency, and number of passengers. The data provide
a relatively comprehensive view of air-ticket reservations including their time stamps. Note that
MIDT does not contain price information, and we merge it with the web-crawled price informa-
tion. Whenever needed, we supplement this data using other publicly available sources, such as the
DB1B 10% air ticket sample from the Department of Transportation and population and income
data from the Bureau of Economic Analysis.
In sum, there are 5.9 million booking records and 4.5 million fare records. We merge the two
datasets according to markets, departure dates and booking dates. Thus, the combined dataset
provides a nearly complete picture of daily ticket sales and daily lowest fares for 111 city-pair
markets (84 domestic), 45 departure dates, and three-month booking period for each departure
date. In this paper we focus on inter-temporal decisions and aggregate the data across airlines. We
could explicitly consider substitution among different flights and carriers on the demand side and
airline competition on the supply side. We do not possess data to fully implement this approach
since we would need price histories associated with all outbound and inbound flight combinations
of all airlines. Additionally, complexity of the model increases manyfold because one has to model
and compute the competitive equilibrium among airlines in addition to modeling consumer expec-
tations. We leave this for future research. Based on our preliminary analysis, however, we believe
that modeling these aspects is secondary since our focus is on the inter-temporal substitution: we
did attempt to control for the competition level in a crude way but found no significant effects, as
we demonstrate later.
Even though we have taken great effort to assemble this massive database, note that this data
is aggregate in that we observe only the daily purchases and available prices, not individual search
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behavior. However, in most circumstances, firms have access only to aggregate data such as we have
here, in which case structural estimations are appropriate to infer strategic consumer behavior.
We further aggregate the data by booking week for the following reasons: First, this aggregation
level is consistent with industry practices and with related papers (Mantin and Gillen 2011, Hendel
and Nevo 2011, Granados et al. 2011): a common practice to construct a fare class is to require
21-/14-/7-day advance purchase. As a result, price varies more from week to week than from day
to day as we will demonstrate. Second, one would expect that even myopic consumers may take a
few days before making a purchase decision, and even the most strategic consumers cannot wait
indefinitely. Letting consumers make purchase decisions at the weekly level allows us to account for
air-travel planning horizons of both myopic and strategic consumers to a certain extent. Finally,
for reasons to be explained later, aggregation at a lower level would make estimation prohibitively
complex computationally.
We note significant amount of price variation from the data. The overall standard deviation of
prices is about 80% of the mean, as shown in Table 1. To further investigate the inter-temporal
component of the price variation, we summarize frequencies of price trends in Table 2. On average,
the weekly fare decreases in the subsequent week with 39.5% probability, increases with 51.2%
probability, and remains constant with 9.3% probability. In comparison, most often (47.2% of the
time) the daily fare stays unchanged. This probability varies significantly by market, departure date
and booking week. This persistent inter-temporal variation underscores the uncertainty in prices
faced by air-travel consumers, and also the potential opportunities for consumers to strategize on
the timing of purchase.
4. Preliminary Results using Reduced-Form Regressions
Before formulating the structural model, we first look at preliminary results from reduced-form
regressions, which highlight the potential endogeneity problems and lead us to the structural
approach. In the absence of strategic consumers, demand dt in period t is correlated with the price
of that period pt, but not with prices of past or future periods, everything else being properly
controlled for. However, when some consumers strategically postpone their purchase decisions in
anticipation of a price decrease, demand will be correlated with past and future prices. The lower
the future prices or expected future prices, the more likely consumers are willing to delay their
purchases. To test this, we estimate weekly demand using the following three models: 1) a basic
model that accounts only for the price of the current week, 2) a model that accounts for realized
future and past prices, 3) a model that accounts for expected prices. To show the primary effects,
we consider prices only one period (i.e., one week) ahead:
dt = α+β0pt +Xγ+ εt, (1)
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dt = α+β0pt +β1pt+1 +β2pt−1 +Xγ+ εt, (2)
dt = α+β0pt +β1pˆt+1 +β2pt−1 +β3pˆt +Xγ+ εt, (3)
where the X includes covariates such as polynomials of booking time and market departure date
characteristics; see Table 3 for a description of these variables. Controlling for the realized future
and past prices, Model 2 corresponds to the case in which strategic consumers have perfect knowl-
edge about future prices. We expect β1 and β2 to be positive if there is inter-temporal substitution.
However, consumers most likely do not have perfect knowledge of future prices, but rather make
predictions of future prices based on historical prices and other information available. We control
for the expected prices pˆt+1 and pˆt in Model 3. Expected prices are obtained using four period
lags of prices and other market covariates, which together explain up to 80% to 90% of the price
variations. Strategic consumers who arrive at time t−1 will base their timing of purchase on price
pt−1 and the expected price pˆt. The coefficient β1, β2 in Model 3 should have the same sign as in
Model 2, while the coefficient β3 of pˆt should have a sign opposite to β2.
We run regressions on a sample market and present the results in Table 4. All signs are as
expected except for that of the lagged price in Model 2, largely supporting our belief about the
presence of strategic consumers. The results tell us how sensitive the current demand is to prices
in adjacent time periods. Although this simple approach is indicative of the presence of strategic
consumers, it suffers from several drawbacks. First is the price endogeneity commonly seen in static
settings. The current price may be correlated with the current demand shock as firms usually have
better knowledge of demand shocks than we do as econometricians, leading to positively biased
price sensitivities. Second, the dynamics add an additional layer to price endogeneity. For example,
in Model 2, the positive correlation between demand dt and future price pt+1 can be explained
either as strategic consumers waiting for prices to drop or as prices drop as a result of previously
realized low demand, again biasing the price sensitivity positively. Using expected prices instead
of realized prices may alleviate but not fully resolve this problem. The expected future price can
still be correlated with demand shocks through the current price, which again introduces positive
bias in price sensitivities. In fact, we do find many insignificant price coefficients for many markets.
Since all price variables are endogenous, we would need multiple Instrument Variables (IVs), and
finding IVs in this setting is not trivial because they would need to vary across the booking periods.
Cost-based supply shifters (e.g., fuel prices and labor costs) are not useful because weekly prices
do not respond to these cost factors in the short run. Other IVs used in airline studies, such as
distance and demographics (Borenstein and Rose 1994, Granados et al. 2011) are not applicable
either since they do not vary over the booking period. In addition to the endogeneity problem,
it is also not clear how to explain the estimated coefficients (e.g., β1, β3): although one would get
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a sense of how sensitive demand is to adjacent prices, it is hard to get a sense of how strategic
consumers are from these estimates, especially if we want to compare them across markets. In sum,
although reduced-form regressions seem to provide some evidence of varying prices and strategic
consumer behavior, these simple models cannot properly address multiple econometric issues. We
turn next to the structural modeling approach.
5. The Structural Model
5.1. The Demand Model
We first consider the decision of a consumer who desires to travel in a particular city-pair market
on a particular departure date. We assume that both the market and the day of departure are
given exogenously. To focus on the inter-temporal substitution, we further ignore substitution
between nearby airports and among adjacent departure dates. In our model, needs for travel arise
exogenously. A consumer arriving at the booking time t can be either strategic (with probability
θ) or myopic (with probability 1− θ). Our goal is to obtain an estimate of the fraction of strategic
consumers (i.e., θ) in the population.
Myopic consumers are those who arrive at t and immediately make a purchase-or-not decision.
If a myopic consumer decides not to buy at time t, he will never come back. Strategic consumers
are those who arrive at t but may decide to postpone their purchase and come back later. For
computational reasons, we make a conservative assumption that strategic consumers wait for at
most one period of time1. Should she decide to wait, she will come back later and decide whether or
not to purchase the ticket. The waiting decision of a strategic consumer depends on her expectation
of future prices, which we discuss later. Consumers in our model are heterogeneous along the
following three dimensions: 1) time of arrival (e.g., Su 2007, Aviv and Pazgal 2008); 2) strategic
or myopic (e.g., Su 2007, Cachon and Swinney 2009); and 3) valuation of the products (e.g.,
Levin et al. 2009). Valuation does not affect waiting decisions in our model as we discuss shortly.
Furthermore, we will allow for different price sensitivities between strategic and myopic consumers
to incorporate heterogeneity in valuation distributions among them.
Knowing the consumers’ problem, we model the aggregate demand observed in each booking
period. The aggregate demand dmt on a city-pair market and departure date dyad m and at booking
time t is composed of three subgroups: 1) myopic consumers who arrive and decide to buy at time
t; 2) strategic consumers who arrive and decide to buy at time t; 3) strategic consumers who arrive
at time t− 1 but wait for one more period and finally decide to buy at time t. Specifically,
dmt = (1− θ)q(pmt,Xm, t)︸ ︷︷ ︸
myopic who purchase at t
+ θ(1− zmt)q(pmt,Xm, t)︸ ︷︷ ︸
strategic who arrive and purchase at t
+ θzm,t−1q(pmt,Xm, t− 1),︸ ︷︷ ︸
strategic who arrive at t−1 and purchase at t
(4)
1 Estimation with two or more waiting periods is extremely expensive computationally. We tried allowing for two-
period waiting under simpler expectation assumptions, perfect foresight and weak-form rational expectation. The
estimated percentage is comparable while slightly smaller. However, the amount of strategic waiting, i.e., (amount of
time waiting) * (number of people waiting), is almost the same.
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where zmt equals 1 if a strategic consumer decides to wait at time t, and 0 otherwise, and q(·) is the
baseline demand that one would observe if all consumers were myopic. Note that the model itself
does not impose the assumption of strategic behavior: only if θ is significantly different from zero
will we have the evidence of strategic behavior. The baseline demand is a function of price pmt,
market and departure-date characteristics Xm, and the time of booking t. Note that the effective
price for those consumers who arrive in the last period t− 1 but wait until t is the current price
pmt rather than the last period’s price pm,t−1. That is, strategic consumers who decide to wait are
not obligated to buy when they come back, and the decision will depend on the new price they see.
Thus, the demand contribution from those who arrive in the previous period is q(pmt,Xm, t− 1)
rather than q(pm,t−1,Xm, t − 1). In the following subsections, we discuss in detail the modeling
alternatives, assumptions, and potential extensions of each input of this model.
5.1.1. Baseline Demand Functional Form. The baseline demand q(pmt,Xm, t) represents
the potential demand we will observe if all consumers are myopic. A common way to model demand
is the additive linear demand model: q(pmt,Xm, t) = α − βpmt + f(t) + Xmδ + εmt, where f(t)
captures the time trend approximated, for instance, by a polynomial function of booking time t,
and εmt is the demand shock. The main results of this paper will be based on the linear model, but
we also present results with the nonlinear exponential demand model with multiplicative errors:
q(pmt,Xm, t) = exp
(
α−βpmt + f(t) +Xmδ+ εmt
)
.
Endogeneity of Price and Structure of Demand Shocks. Even though we control for
market-departure-date characteristics, prices may still be endogenous in this setting. First, pricing
managers who monitor the demand and prices have better knowledge about the local demand than
we do as econometricians. For example, when there is a special event, such as a conference or a
convention, managers might adjust prices for that departure date and city accordingly. Second,
pricing managers adjust prices based on previously realized demand shocks, and if demand shocks
are auto-correlated, prices will be correlated with contemporaneous demand shocks as well. These
particular features of the air-travel industry make price endogeneity a more prominent issue than
in many other industries, such as the one studied in Hendel and Nevo (2011) where demand is
more stable over time. Failure to address these endogeneity issues will result in biased estimates of
price sensitivity, and hence the estimates of other parameters of the model such as the fraction of
strategic consumers. The direction of this bias can go both ways. If price endogeneity is not properly
accounted for, as usual, price sensitivities will be underestimated. During price drops, a part of
the incremental demand caused by the price sensitivity of myopic consumers will be attributed
to strategic consumers, so the fraction of strategic consumers will be overestimated. During price
surges, however, the observed decrease in demand is smaller with strategic consumers than without
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them. Since the potential decrease in demand without strategic consumers is underestimated, the
part attributed to the strategic consumers, that is, potential decrease minus observed decrease,
will be underestimated. The overall effect is ambiguous. To address the endogeneity, we allow for
the following structure of demand shocks:
εmt = µm + mt, (5)
mt = ρm,t−1 + νmt, (6)
where the demand shock εmt is decomposed to a market-departure-date specific shock, µm, and
a serially correlated shock governed by AR(1) process, mt. Price pt is allowed to be correlated
with the demand shock εmt through correlation with µm and m,t−1. The remaining part of the
demand shock, νmt, is a pure noise, i.i.d across markets, departure dates and booking periods, and
uncorrelated with other observables, including prices.
Heterogeneity in Price Sensitivities between Myopic and Strategic Consumers. One
might expect strategic consumers to be more sensitive to prices than non-strategic consumers. To
allow for this possibility, let βn and βs denote the price sensitivities of non-strategic and strategic
consumers, respectively. The demand can be written as follows,
dmt = (1− θ)qn(pmt,Xm, t) + θ(1− zmt)qs(pmt,Xm, t) + θzm,t−1qs(pmt,Xm, t− 1),
qn(pmt,Xm, t) = α−βnpmt + f(t) +Xmδ+ εmt,
qs(pmt,Xm, t) = α−βspmt + f(t) +Xmδ+ εmt.
Now we need to be careful about the interpretation of the fraction θ. In the previous case where
strategic and non-strategic consumers have the same price sensitivities, the fraction of strategic
consumers is constant regardless of prices. However, the observed fraction will change with prices
if different price sensitivities are permitted. The higher the price, the fewer strategic consumers
we expect to observe. Thus, the fraction θ represents the relative scale of strategic consumers
at price zero. We define the observed fraction of strategic consumer θobs,t at time t as θobs,t =
qs(pmt,Xm, t)/qn(pmt,Xm, t).
5.1.2. Consumer Expectations. Strategic consumers’ waiting decision is based on their
beliefs about future prices. Note that price levels also manifest the risk of stock-out thanks to the
practice of revenue management. Bid prices, as approximated by the lowest prices in our model,
reflect the level of remaining seat inventory or the probability of stock-out at different book-
ing occasions. We model consumers’ waiting decision under three different circumstances with a
decreasing level of consumer sophistication: perfect foresight, strong-form rational expectations and
weak-form rational expectations. Under perfect foresight consumers predict future prices perfectly.
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Under rational expectations, consumers cannot predict the exact price individually, yet as a group
they predict the future price distribution correctly. The distinction between strong form and weak
form is that, under the strong-form, consumers consider airlines’ pricing strategy when forming the
expectation, while under the weak-form, the expectation is based on historical information only.
Perfect Foresight. At time t, strategic consumers know the exact future price pm,t+1. Though
unrealistic, this model can be used as a benchmark. Consider a consumer with utility of traveling
denoted by φ. She will decide to wait if φ− pm,t+1 >φ− pmt, or pm,t+1 < pmt, that is, if price drops
in the next period. Note that time discounting is negligible in this setting since we are looking at
relatively short time periods such as days or weeks. Moreover, utility of air-travel does not depend
on the time of purchase: the product is always consumed on the day of departure. As a result, a
consumer’s purchase-or-wait decision is not dependent on the value of the product φ. In this model
we do not consider costs of waiting (e.g., costs associated with obtaining a price quote again in
the future) or benefits of waiting (e.g., flexibilities associated with keeping the schedule open and
committing at a later time). Moreover, when a consumer anticipates future prices perfectly, risk
attitude will not be a determinant of the purchase-or-wait decision.
Weak-Form Rational Expectation. A strategic consumer i makes a prediction of the future
price pm,t+1 at time t based on information available to her at time t, i.e., Imt and a personal
shock, i.e., oimt, p˜i,m,t+1 = E[pm,t+1|Imt] + oi,mt, where E[pm,t+1|Imt] is the expectation of future
prices given information set Imt. Information set Imt includes, for instance, historical prices, price
volatility, and market departure date characteristics. Under the rational expectation assumption,
the distribution of consumer belief p˜i,m,t+1 is the same as that of the true conditional distribution
of future price pm,t+1|Imt. Therefore, the probability that strategic consumers wait will be the same
as Pr(pm,t+1 < pmt|Imt), which can be estimated using a Logit or Probit model.
Strong-Form Rational Expectation. Consumers now consider airlines’ pricing strategy when
forming expectation of future prices. Consider the following game played by the airline and the
consumers. Stage 1: at the beginning of time t, baseline demand shock νmt is realized, and con-
sumers arrive and see the pmt. Myopic consumers make their purchase based on pmt. Each strategic
consumer forms her own prediction of future price and makes the purchase-or-wait decision. Total
demand dmt is thus realized. Stage 2: at the beginning of time t+ 1, a supply shock denoted by
ωm,t+1 is realized and airlines make a decision on price pm,t+1 based on the previous demands
dmk, k= 1,2, ..., t, the observed supply shock ωm,t+1 and other inputs.
In the rational expectations equilibrium, strategic consumers collectively anticipate the true price
distribution. Consumers do not necessarily need to know the exact demand shock νmt. As long as it
is realized, this information will not be wasted in an efficient market. The only source of variation
for the price pm,t+1 at the time when consumers form expectations is the unrealized supply shock.
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With this assumption, the equilibrium belief of future price distribution and probability of waiting
can be found through estimating the supply model, which we describe in the next section.
Under either weak-form or strong-form rational expectation, once we obtain the probability of
strategic consumers waiting Prmt, we can replace zmt with Prmt in Equation 4. We note that
the rational expectations model is likely to provide higher estimates of the fraction of strategic
consumers than the perfect foresight model. The reason is that, under the perfect foresight, every
strategic consumer anticipates price drops correctly and waits. Under the rational expectations,
only a portion of strategic consumers correctly anticipate price drops. Thus, the same amount of
demand shifting observed in the data caused by strategic waiting corresponds to more underlying
strategic consumers under the rational expectations assumption.
5.1.3. Fraction of Strategic Consumers. So far we have assumed the fraction of strategic
consumers to be time-independent. However, strategic consumers may be more likely to arrive at
certain stages over the booking horizon. We estimate a vector of fractions for the entire booking
horizon non-parametrically, θ˜ = [θ1, θ2, ..., θT−1], where θt represents the fraction of strategic con-
sumers arriving at the booking time t, and T is the final booking period. Note that no strategic
consumers arrive in the last period before departure, i.e., θT = 0, which is also true in the case of
constant fraction.
5.2. The Supply Model
Recall that one reason to specify the supply model (or pricing strategy) is to estimate the demand
model under the strong-form rational expectations. Another reason is that we need to know the
firm’s strategy in order to compute new equilibrium in the counterfactual analysis as we change
certain parameters. Ideally, the most desired supply model would mimic the exact network-based
dynamic inventory control algorithms and demand forecasting strategies used in the airline indus-
try, and take into account the effect of competition. Such a dynamic game is far too complex to
be amenable both analytically and computationally within the scope of this paper. Moreover, this
approach would invoke an assumption on firms’ current conduct — that they are profit maximiz-
ers and already make the optimal decisions. This may not be the case (e.g., we know airlines do
not currently take strategic consumers into account), and, more important, this assumption would
make our pricing recommendations redundant. Instead, we take an empirical approach to approx-
imate the firms’ current equilibrium pricing strategy, as many other structural models do (e.g.,
Nair 2007). Note that short-term price fluctuations in the airline industry are not based on costs,
as fixed costs are sunk and marginal costs are minimal. The key determinants of prices are the
remaining seat inventory and demand forecasts (see Gallego and van Ryzin 1994). When restricted
to one particular market, we can account for the remaining inventory level using the cumulative
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demand since the total capacity is largely fixed in the short term. We therefore model the price as
a function of previous prices and demands, market and departure date characteristics, and supply
shocks. We find that lag-1 price, initial price pm0, and cumulative demand up to time t together
with other controls are able to explain nearly 90% of the price variations for most markets. We
therefore choose the following parsimonious model on the supply side:
pm,t+1 = γppmt + γdcum demandmt + γ0pm0 +Xm,t+1γ+ωm,t+1, ωm,t+1 ∼N(0, σm,t+1),
ωm,t+1 is a random supply shock, which we assume to be uncorrelated with the demand shock.
Since the fixed component (µmt) and the autocorrelated component (ρmt) of the demand shock are
accounted for by lag-1 price, cumulative demand, and initial price. The remaining part of time t+1
demand shock (νm,t+1) can be assumed to be uncorrelated with ωm,t+1. We do not find evidence of
serial correlation in the residuals after controlling for the lag-1 price. However, we do find evidence
of heteroscedasticity in the residuals over booking time, so we allow the variation of the supply
shock (σmt) to change with booking time.
It is important to note at this point how the structural model outperforms the reduced-form
regressions in addressing the econometric issues previously discussed. First, the mechanism by
which expected prices affect current and future demands is explicitly specified in the structural
model, rather than merely through correlations (β1, β3) in the reduced-form regressions. More
important, the error generating process is explicitly specified as well. As the demand inlcudes both
strategic and myopic consumers, the demand shock is composed of shocks to both groups as well.
The shock first affects the arrival of both strategic and myopic consumers, and then translates
into the current and future demands dependent on the strategic behaviors. In the reduced-form
regression, we have only one blended error term. Even if one can arbitrarily apply techniques to
control for fixed effects and serial correlation in reduced-form regressions, it makes more sense to
specify the underlying error generating process.
6. Identification and Estimation
6.1. Identification
As we outlined earlier, there is a significant amount of intertemporal price fluctuation present in
the data: in addition to frequent changes in weekly fares, there are also cross-market, departure-
date and booking-week variations. The identification of the fraction of strategic consumers θ is
based on the variation of price trends. As we explain shortly, the estimation is conducted for each
market separately, so the identification is based on the variation of price trajectories across booking
occasions and departure dates within the same market.
The presence of strategic consumers affects observed demand only when the price falls or is
expected to fall. When the price increases or is expected to increase, strategic consumers behave in
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the same way as their myopic counterparts. In this case, variations in demand are attributed only
to price elasticity. However, in the case of price reductions, variations in demand can be attributed
to both price elasticity and strategic consumers. If we are able to quantify the changes in demand
induced by price elasticity, the extra variations in demand can be attributed to strategic consumers.
The question is: how do we identify price sensitivities and the fraction of strategic consumers
separately? To illustrate this more precisely, recall the model under perfect foresight (Equation 4)
and consider the following cases described by waiting decisions zm,t−1 and zmt, equivalent to price
trends under perfect foresight:
Case 1: zm,t−1 = 0, zmt = 0 ⇒ dmt = q(pmt,Xm, t),
Case 2: zm,t−1 = 0, zmt = 1 ⇒ dmt = (1− θ)q(pmt,Xm, t),
Case 3: zm,t−1 = 1, zmt = 0 ⇒ dmt = q(pmt,Xm, t) + θq(pmt,Xm, t− 1),
Case 4: zm,t−1 = 1, zmt = 1 ⇒ dmt = (1− θ)q(pmt,Xm, t) + θq(pmt,Xm, t− 1).
In Case 1, the price keeps rising from time t−1 to t and to t+1, so the observed sales comes down
to the baseline demand dmt = q(pmt,Xm, t). Thus, q(·) can be identified. That is, price sensitivities
are identified based on occasions with increasing prices. Once the baseline demand function is
identified, each of the other three cases can help identify the fraction θ. Precisely, it is the variation
in z, i.e., the price trend, that identifies the fraction of strategic consumers. Note, however, that
the fraction θ is over-identified, since all three cases can help identification. This means that we can
actually identify more parameters, which takes us to the identification of the time-variant fraction
θ˜t, t= 1,2, ..., T − 1. For example, Cases 2 and 3 can now be written as dmt = (1− θt)q(pmt,Xm, t)
and dmt = q(pmt,Xm, t)+θt−1q(pmt,Xm, t−1), respectively, which allows us to identify θt and θt−1.
To see if price sensitivities are still identified when we allow for different sensitivities between
strategic and non-strategic consumers, we again look at different cases classified by the value of
zm,t−1, zmt,
Case 1: zm,t−1 = 0, zmt = 0 ⇒ dmt =−
(
(1− θ)βn + θβs
)
pmt +Xmtγ,
Case 2: zm,t−1 = 0, zmt = 1 ⇒ dmt =−(1− θ)βnpmt + (1− θ)Xmtγ.
From Case 2, we can identify (1− θ)βn, and (1− θ)γ, but not θ,βn, γ separately. From Case 1, we
are able to identify γ from the variation of Xmt
2. Together with (1− θ)γ identified in Case 2, we
are able to identify θ. Since Case 1 also identifies
(
(1− θ)βn + θβs
)
, together with (1− θ)βn and θ,
we are able to identify βs and βn. Similarly, θ is again over-identified, since there are other cases
2 For simplicity, we include all variables other than price into Xmt, i.e., the constant, polynomials of t and market-
departure-date characteristics Xm.
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based on zm,t−1, zmt which help us identify θ as well. These over-identification conditions can again
be utilized to identify the vector θ˜t, t= 1,2, ..., T − 1.
So far we have discussed the identification for models under perfect foresight. In fact, the same
logic also carries over to models under rational expectations since the only difference is that zmt
becomes a probability rather than a {0,1} variable. The variation in z (now Pr) still serves as the
source of identification for θ. More precisely, under rational expectations, we first fit a model to
predict strategic consumers’ probability of waiting, and then use the variation in this probability
to identify the fraction of strategic consumers. In summary, we obtain the identification because
strategic consumers behave differently under different expectations of future prices.
6.2. Estimation
Note that our demand model is nonlinear in its parameters (θ,β, γ, ρ). The moment condition
used in estimation has the mean independence property3, E[νmt|Xm, pmt] = 0, which guarantees
unbiased estimators (see Wooldridge 2010). The key challenges in estimation are 1) finding the
global optimal solution to a minimization problem where the first order conditions are not linear in
parameters, and 2) accounting for fixed effects and serial correlations in error terms in the nonlinear
minimization problem. We design an algorithm and describe it in the appendix. Briefly, the key
idea is to first transform the nonlinear problem into a linear problem to address the error structure
given a partial set of parameters, and then minimize over this parameter set.
We use bootstrapping to obtain the standard errors and confidence intervals.To guarantee that all
booking periods for a particular departure date in a market are selected or not selected as a whole,
we use clustered bootstrapping. That is, the resampling is done at the level of market-departure-
date rather than booking period. Although adjacent departure dates in the same markets might not
be completely independent, the correlation is of less concern compared to the correlation of booking
periods for the same departure date. In our data, 250 rounds of bootstraps are sufficient to obtain
convergence in standard error estimations. However, it takes substantially more rounds (1,000)
to obtain an accurate estimate of the confidence interval. Since the estimates of the fraction of
strategic consumers are bounded within [0,1] and the bootstrapping distributions of these fractions
are largely asymmetric, it is important to bootstrap the percentile confidence intervals rather than
to compute the confidence intervals from standard errors.
We perform estimation market by market since each market demonstrates significantly different
patterns of time trends, seasonality, day-of-week effects and price sensitivities. Pooling all markets
3 After controlling for fixed effects and serial correlation, it is relatively reasonable to assume that price is uncorrelated
with the remaining part of the error term. We do not find evidence of correlation between the residuals (νˆmt) and
prices (with a correlation less than 0.01). We also considered using previous cumulative demand and previous demand
as instruments. However, they sometime show stronger correlation with the error terms than prices.
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together without accounting for these differences would result in misspecification of the baseline
demand model, which would further bias the estimation of the fraction of strategic consumers. To
mitigate this effect we would need hundreds of market-specific coefficients. Instead, the estimation
is more accurate and efficient when it is performed for each market separately. On average, it took
one to five hours to run 1,000 bootstraps for each market, depending on the model specification.
This amounts to 100 to 500 hours of computation time for each model specification run over
all markets. The long running time is largely due to the non-linearity of the model, randomized
initialization to guarantee global optimality, and the large number of bootstraps. We code the
program in MATLAB and we run it on the Wharton Grid Computing Platform (a 20-node, 80-CPU
Linux grid and cluster environment).
6.2.1. Variables In this section, we discuss the variables used in the aforementioned models.
We provide a list of these variables and their descriptions in Table 3.
Baseline Demand Model. The baseline demand is affected by the following factors. 1) Price.
We use the lowest daily price among multiple candidates for the price measure. This is a good
approximate price point since we care most about strategic consumers who are presumably in search
of the lowest prices. On most booking days, there is no obvious deviation between the lowest price
and, say, the average of the three lowest prices, except for a few days close to departure. In addition,
lowest daily prices are also a commonly used measure in industry practices (e.g., Farecast) and
related papers (e.g., Mantin and Gillen 2011). To aggregate daily price points to the weekly level,
there are at least two options — the minimum and the average of the lowest daily prices within a
week. Significant differences mostly appear in the final week before departure, when prices change
rapidly from day to day. For this reason we use the average of the lowest daily prices as the measure
of the weekly price; otherwise, the price sensitivity in the final weeks before departure is not well
captured. 2) Booking time: booking week and its polynomials, and the final booking week before
departure. 3) Departure-date characteristics. Due to seasonal demand patterns, some departure
dates have higher demand than others. For example, during the vacation seasons leisure destinations
experience many more travelers than they normally do. We control for demand seasonality by
identifying the high-demand season from the data, which corresponds roughly to the spring break
period. Seasonality is more obvious for leisure destinations than for business destinations. We also
control for the day-of-week effect of the departure date using dummies. Departures tend to cluster
around weekdays in business markets, and around weekends in leisure markets.
Weak-Form Rational Expectations. In this case the predictors of future prices include his-
torical prices and other information available to the decision makers. 1) Relative fares. The current
fare relative to the fare of the last period, to the initial fare, and to the average market fare obtained
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from the DB1B dataset. 2) Price volatility. The coefficient of variation of daily fares within a week4.
3) The initial price. Initial prices are highly correlated with demands across departure dates, which
reflects the fact that fare managers have some knowledge of demand when making the initial pricing
decision. 4) Booking time and departure date characteristics.
The Supply Model, Strong-Form Rational Expectations. The variables include last
period price, cumulative demand, the initial price, booking time and departure date characteristics.
7. Results
Our estimations provide consistent findings of strategic consumers across markets under various
model specifications. We first illustrate these findings using different model specifications applied
to two representative markets, and then we summarize them across all markets. The representative
markets include one leisure market, labeled as L, with Orlando, Florida as the destination and
one business market, labeled as B, with Atlanta, Georgia as the destination. The origins of both
markets are disguised for confidentiality reasons.
7.1. Results under Different Baseline Demand Models
In Table 5 we compare three different baseline demand models under perfect consumer foresight:
1) the linear model, 2) the linear model with correction of price endogeneity, and 3) the nonlinear
exponential model5. As we show in the table, all models lead to similar estimates of the fraction
of strategic consumers, about 3% to 5% for this particular market under perfect foresight. (3.6%
under the linear model, 5.2% under the linear model with endogeneity corrections, and 2.5% under
the nonlinear model.) We select the linear model with endogeneity correction as the basis for
subsequent analysis since it addresses the potential biases associated with the basic linear model
and is computationally more efficient than the nonlinear model. It turns out that the linear model
with endogeneity correction has the best model fit as well in terms of R-square, explaining 39%
of the variation on average, and in some markets as high as 60% to 70%. Comparing the results
of the two linear models, we find that, as expected, price sensitivity is underestimated when the
endogeneity issues are not addressed: without correction for endogeneity the price sensitivity is
-0.174, while controlling for endogeneity it is -0.224. In this particular market, this further leads
to an underestimation of the fraction of strategic consumers, i.e., 0.036 as compared to 0.052. In
other markets, we observe overestimation of the fraction.
The signs of other coefficients are in line with our expectations. We use booking week t, t2, t3
as controls for the time trend because the incremental explanatory power is minimal when adding
4 Using standard deviation and coefficient of variation with or without first-differencing yield similar results.
5 We also estimate a nonlinear model with correction for price endogeneity. The performance of this model turns out
to be almost the same as for the basic nonlinear model, but it takes four to five times longer to estimate due to the
high level of non-linearity.
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higher polynomial terms. We see that the final week before departure has a strong positive effect
on demand, especially in business markets. Departure date characteristics (seasonality and day-
of-week effects) also have significant effects on total demand. In many markets, the estimated
serial correlation between adjacent demand shocks is large and significant (mildly significant in
this market though), highlighting the importance of controlling for the serial correlation.
7.2. Results under Different Consumer Expectation Assumptions
Now we move on to compare the estimated fractions of strategic consumers under different assump-
tions about consumer expectation; we present the results in Table 6. In this market we find persis-
tent evidence of strategic consumers regardless of the assumptions about consumer expectation of
future prices. Under the benchmark model, i.e., perfect foresight, the fraction of strategic consumers
is significant at 5.2%. Under the rational expectations assumption, the estimates are higher, as we
expected: 29.2% and 38.5% under strong-form and weak-form rational expectation, respectively. All
estimates are statistically significant. Naturally, the results from the rational expectations model
are likely to be closer to the truth since in reality it is not possible to predict future prices perfectly.
One also needs to be cautious when comparing these fractions: although the estimate under rational
expectations can be significantly higher than that under perfect foresight, it does not necessarily
mean more strategic waiting. Ultimately, the demand shift observed due to strategic consumers is
also dependent on consumers’ ability to make predictions of future prices. Since some consumers
are not able to correctly anticipate future prices, they would not behave “strategically” when they
should. However, there is a possibility that with the proliferation of web tools such as fare charts
and fare alerts, consumers are becoming better at making price predictions. The demand shifting
effect will become more prominent in this case. Estimates of other control variables are consistent
across three models and are of expected signs. The results of the prediction models used in the
weak-form and the strong-form rational expectations are shown in Appendix Table 12.
7.3. Heterogeneity in Price Sensitivities
Strategic consumers may have different price sensitivity from myopic consumers. As we see in the
identification section, estimations of price sensitivity and of the fraction of strategic consumers
are closely related to each other. Therefore, there may be a concern that the fraction of strategic
consumers we identify could be partially driven by the different price sensitivities of these two
consumer groups. To investigate this possibility, we estimate different price sensitivities for strategic
and myopic consumers. The results are shown in Table 7. For the leisure Market L, we do not
observe significant differences in the price sensitivities among these two groups, and hence the
estimates of strategic fractions do not change much. However, for the business Market B, we do
observe a significant difference in price sensitivities among these two groups. As we discussed
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earlier, the observed fraction θobs of strategic consumers at a particular price point is not the same
as the parameter θ. In Market L, the two estimates are similar since the difference between the
two price sensitivities is small. In Market B, however, θobs is much less than θ.
Finally, we summarize the estimation results over all markets in Table 8 using histograms. For
each market in our data, we estimate the strong-form rational expectation model under the same
price sensitivity and different price sensitivities. We obtain on average 24% strategic consumers
under the former and 17% under the latter. We also find a sizable heterogeneity across markets,
with standard deviations of 12% and 11%, respectively. To investigate how strategic behavior is
affected by the market characteristics, we regressed the fraction (the logistic transformation of
the fraction) on market characteristics such as level of competition, presence of low-cost carriers,
distance and origin demographics, destination types (business vs. leisure), distribution channel
(online vs. oﬄine), and market size. The results are displayed in Table 9. We find that markets
with shorter distance, higher income at the origin city, and smaller market size tend to have more
strategic consumers. Given the number of markets we have, our ability to expand this analysis is
limited.
7.4. Time-Variant Fraction of Strategic Consumers
To investigate the arrival pattern of strategic consumers over booking time, we estimate non-
parametrically a time-variant vector of the fractions of strategic consumers. To show the general
pattern, we group the results by destination, since the trend of the fraction over time for routes with
the same destination are similar. Figure 1 shows the fraction of strategic consumers over twelve
booking periods before the final booking period, estimated under strong-form rational expectation
and with heterogeneity in price sensitivities. As we see in the figure, the fraction of strategic
consumers is higher at the beginning of the booking horizon, that is, when risk and waiting costs are
lower, or close to departure, likely in search of last-minute deals. This pattern is less prominent in
popular markets such as Las Vegas (LAS) and Orlando (MCO), which is in line with the observation
that last-minute deals are often offered in less-popular markets where there is distressed inventory.
Those consumers who arrive for the last-minute deals are also flexible in their travel schedules, so
they can decide to travel without much advance planning if the price is low, or decide not to travel
if the price is high.
8. Counterfactual Analysis
Now that we have robust evidence of strategic consumers, what are the revenue implications? What
strategies should airlines take in response? We answer these questions using counterfactual analysis.
We focus on 1) the revenue impact of the presence of strategic consumers, and 2) alternative pricing
schemes to eliminate strategic waiting.
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Figure 1 Fraction of Strategic Consumers Varying with Booking Time (grouped by destination)
8.1. Revenue Impact of Strategic Consumers
The commonly held belief regarding strategic consumers is that they pose a threat to the revenues
of the firms (see Anderson and Wilson 2003, Aviv and Pazgal 2008, Levin et al. 2009). Surprisingly,
we find from our counterfactual analysis that this is not always true. As a matter of fact, strategic
waiting may sometimes benefit the seller, an effect that is in line with the predictions by Su (2007)
and Cho et al. (2008). Table 10 illustrates this through two examples, based on 100 simulations
using the most complex model specification with heterogeneity in price sensitivity and time-variant
fraction of strategic consumers. The results hold across other model specifications as well. Under
rational expectations, each simulation involves computing a new equilibrium of consumer beliefs
and actual future prices. We ask the following question: how much will revenues change if all
consumers turn from myopic to strategic? To isolate the effect of price sensitivities and the effect
of being strategic, we let myopic consumers become strategic without changing their original price
sensitivities. As shown in Column 5, for business markets such as Market B, revenue decreases by
0.40% to 1.01%, while in leisure markets such as Market L, revenue increases by 0.22% to 1.39%
(with small standard deviations in both markets). This pattern is not specific to these two example
markets but holds in general, as we demonstrate shortly.
To explain the phenomenon, consider the two effects of strategic consumers: the price-reduction
effect and the demand-increasing effect. Strategic consumers drive down prices, and as a result
firms cannot charge high prices even to high-value customers. Yet strategic consumers drive up
demand in two ways. While the first is obvious — demand is higher since prices are lower—
the second is more subtle. Some low-value customers will not buy at the price when they first
arrive. The flexibility of being able to come back in later periods offers them more purchasing
chances, and they may end up buying. Which effect dominates depends on the heterogeneity in
the composition of high-value and low-value customers in the market. In business markets with
proportionally more high-value customers, the price-reduction effect dominates, whereas in leisure
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markets with proportionally more low-value customers, the demand-increasing effect dominates.
Table 10 illustrates the dominant effect for each market. The average price decreases by 2.55% in
business market B, similar to that (2.85%) in leisure market L assuming perfect foresight (or 0.71%
compared to 0.65% assuming rational expectation); however, demand increases by only 1.59% in
business market B, much smaller than the 4.36% increase in leisure market L (or 0.31% compared
to 0.88% assuming rational expectation).
We present summaries and histograms of the impacts of strategic consumers on revenues across
all markets in the left panel of Table 11. The ranges of revenue impacts are [-2.7%, 1.0%] under
perfect foresight and [-1.0%, 0.8%] under rational expectations, as measured by the 5th and 95th
percentiles. Since our data includes inventory classes, we are able to compute the percentage of
consumers who purchased full fares (inventory class Y and B) as a measure of the extent to which
the route is a business route. This measure is negatively correlated with the revenue impact. The
coefficient of correlation is -0.366 and -0.216 under perfect foresight and rational expectations,
respectively, suggesting that the more “business” the route is, the more likely it is that the presence
of strategic consumers will have a negative effect on the revenues. Plus, we find no significant effect
of competition when regressing the revenue changes on various market characteristics. Table 10
also shows that the effects of strategic consumers tend to be more negative when they are more
sophisticated in their prediction of future prices.
8.2. Non-Decreasing Price Commitment
One common approach to eliminate strategic waiting is to commit to fixed or non-decreasing price
paths, which is the practice often used by low-cost carriers. For example, Southwest has much more
transparent and simpler fare structures than the legacy airlines, and their prices only go up as the
departure date approaches, except for some occasional temporary sales. The question is: would it
be better for airlines to commit to non-decreasing prices? Computing the optimal non-decreasing
price path is itself a question requiring separate analytical efforts beyond the scope of this paper.
Instead, we examine the impact of a heuristic non-decreasing price scheme which adds a small
twist to the current pricing strategy. We take the current pricing strategy and use it to predict a
candidate price point for the next period. We set the future price as the maximum of this candidate
price and the current price to guarantee that it is non-decreasing.
Column 6 in Table 10 shows that for business markets where strategic consumers are undesir-
able, commitment to non-decreasing price ensures higher revenues — 2.9% to 3.6% higher in this
example. However, on the leisure markets, such commitment would not be beneficial to the firms:
revenues decrease by 2.4% to 3.7% in the example. The impacts of committing to non-decreasing
price schemes across different markets are presented in the right panel of Table 11. The ranges
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of the revenue gains are [-1.4%, 9.2%] under perfect foresight and [-1.1%, 10.6%] under rational
expectations, as measured by the 5th and 95th percentiles. The coefficient of correlation between
the measure of how business-like the market is and the revenue gains is positive, i.e., 0.249 and
0.220 under perfect foresight and rational expectations, respectively. This suggests that the more
business-like the route is, the more likely airlines to benefit from non-decreasing price commitment.
9. Conclusions and Discussions
We provide evidence of strategic consumers in the air-travel industry, and this evidence is robust
to various modeling assumptions. We obtain an estimate of 4.9% to 44.9% proportion of strategic
consumers on average across markets under rational expectation assumption. We find that the
fraction of strategic consumers varies significantly across markets, and that strategic consumers
tend to arrive either at the beginning of the booking horizon or close to departure.
Contrary to the predominant belief, our counterfactual analysis shows that strategic consumers
do not always hurt revenues; the effect differs by market type. In business markets, where a large
proportion of consumers are relatively price-inelastic, high value consumers, the presence of strate-
gic consumers tends to drive down the total revenue through lower prices. However, in leisure
markets, the presence of strategic consumers may boost market revenue by inducing higher demand.
Therefore, commitment to non-decreasing prices is more likely to be beneficial in business markets
than in leisure markets. The median revenue improvements on those markets that benefit from this
pricing strategy is 3.5%, with quantiles 1.8% and 5.6%.
Our results have important implications for both theory and practice. In many industries with
significant price fluctuations over time it is crucial to model consumers’ inter-temporal choices,
and we propose a structural model for this purpose. Failing to do so will result in suboptimal
pricing or inventory decisions. Practically, our counterfactual analysis provides important guidance
to airline managers: improve demand forecasts accounting for inter-temporal demand substitution,
assess the impact of strategic consumers, and decide in what circumstances it would be desirable
to eliminate strategic waiting and what is the potential benefit. Our approach can also be applied
to many other industries to help firms figure out whether their business is subject to the presence
of strategic consumers, and what action they should take in response.
Naturally, our study is not free of limitations, which offer many avenues for future research.
As we discussed earlier, we do not model details of inter-firm competition, which merits a sep-
arate paper. Other most obvious restrictions and assumptions are a single waiting time period
(rather than multiple); a discrete, two-point distribution of strategic consumer behavior (rather
than a continuous distribution); and weekly aggregation of the data. We also conduct only limited
counterfactual analysis: a separate study might attempt to devise an entirely new optimization
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algorithm to maximize revenues. These and other extensions will inevitably run into computational
difficulties, and resolving them will be part of the challenge.
References
Anderson, C.K., J.G. Wilson. 2003. Wait or buy? The strategic consumer: pricing and profit implications.
Journal of the Operational Research Society 54(3) 299–306.
Aviv, Y., A. Pazgal. 2008. Optimal pricing of seasonal products in the presence of forward-looking consumers.
Manufacturing & Service Operations Management 10(3) 339–359.
Belobaba, P.P. 1989. Application of a probabilitics decision model to airline seat inventory control. Operations
Research 37(2) 183–197.
Borenstein, S., N.L. Rose. 1994. Competition and Price Dispersion in the U.S. Airline Industry. The Journal
of Political Economy 102(4) 653–683.
Boyd, E.A. 2007. The Future of Pricing: How Airline Ticket Pricing Has Inspired a Revolution. Palgrave-
MacMillan, New York.
Cachon, G.P., R. Swinney. 2009. Purchasing, pricing, and quick response in the presence of strategic con-
sumers. Management Science 55(3) 497–511.
Chellapp, R.K., R.G. Sin, S. Siddarth. 2011. Price Formats as a Source of Price Dispersion: A Study of
Online and Offine Prices in the Domestic U.S. Airline Markets. Information Systems Research 22(1)
83–98.
Chevalier, J., A. Goolsbee. 2009. Are durable goods consumers forward-looking? Evidence from the college
textbooks. The Quarterly Journal of Economics 124(4) 1853–1884.
Cho, M., M. Fan, Y.P. Zhou. 2008. Strategic consumer response to dynamic pricing of perishable products.
Working paper, University of Washington, Seattle, WA.
Clemons, E.K., L. Hitt, I.H. Hann. 2002. Price dispersion and differentiation in online travel: An empirical
investigation. Management Science 48(4) 534–550.
Dillon, W.R., A. Kumar. 1994. Latent structure and other mixture models in marketing: An integrative
survey and overview. R.P. Bagozz, ed., Advanced ethods of Marketing Research. Blackwell Publisher,
Cambridge, 352–388.
Erdem, T., M.P. Keane. 1996. Decision-making under uncertainty: Capturing dynamic choice processes in
turbulent consumer goods markets. Marketing Science 15(1) 1–20.
Etzioni, O., R. Tuchinda, C.A. Knoblock, A. Yates. 2003. To buy or not to buy: Mining airfare data to
minimize ticket purchase price. In Proceedings of KDD03 . ACM Press, 119–128.
Gallego, G.R., G. van Ryzin. 1994. Optimal dynamic pricing of inventories with stochastic demand over
finite horizons. Marketing Science 40(8) 999–1020.
Li, Granados, Netessine: Are Consumers Strategic? 25
Granados, N.F., A. Gupta, R.J. Kauffman. 2011. Online and oﬄine demand and price elasticities: Evidence
from the air travel industry. Information Systems Research Forthcoming.
Hendel, I., A. Nevo. 2006. Measuring the implications of sales and consumer inventory behavior. Economet-
rica 74(6) 1637–1673.
Hendel, I., A. Nevo. 2011. Intertemporal price discrimination in storable good markets. Working paper,
Northwestern University, Evanston, IL.
Jerath, K., S. Netessine, S.K. Veeraraghavan. 2010. Revenue management with strategic customers: Last-
minute selling and opaque selling. Management Science 56(3) 430–448.
Levin, Y., J. McGill, M. Nediak. 2009. Dynamic pricing in the presence of strategic consumers and oligopolis-
tic competition. Management Science 55(1) 32–46.
Liu, Q., G.J. van Ryzin. 2008. Strategic capacity rationing to induce early purchases. Management Science
54(6) 1115–1131.
Magnac, T., D. Thesmar. 2002. Identifying dynamic discrete decision processes. Econometrica 70(2) 801–816.
Mantin, B., D. Gillen. 2011. The hidden information content of price movements. European Journal of
Operational Research Forthcoming.
Nair, H. 2007. Intertemporal price discrimination with forward-looking consumers: Application to the us
market for console video-games. Quantitative Marketing and Economics 5(3) 239–292.
Netessine, S., C. Tang, eds. 2009. Consumer-driven demand and operations management models. Springer
Publisher, New York, NY.
Newman, J.P., M.E. Ferguson, L.A. Garrow. 2010. Estimation of choice-based models using sales data from
a single firm. Working paper, Georgia Institute of Technology, Atlanta, GA.
Osadchiy, N., E. Bendoly. 2010. Are consumers really strategic? Implications from an experimental study.
Working paper, Emory University, Atlanta, GA.
Rust, J. 1994. Structural estimation of markov decision processes. R. Engle, D. McFadden, eds., Handbook
of Econometrics, vol. 4. Elsevier, Amsterdam: North Holland, 3081–3143.
Shen, Z.M., X. Su. 2007. Customer behavior modeling in revenue management and auctions: A review and
new research opportunities. Production and Operations Management 16(6) 713–728.
Su, X. 2007. Inter-temporal pricing with strategic consumer behavior. Management Science 53(5) 726–741.
Talluri, K.T., G.J. van Ryzin. 2005. The Theory and Practice of Revenue Management . Springer, New York.
Vulcano, G., G. van Ryzin, W. Chaar. 2010. Choice-based revenue management: An empirical study of
estimation and optimization. Manufacturing and Service Operations Management 12(3) 371–392.
Wooldridge, J.M. 2010. Econometric analysis of cross section and panel data, chap. 12. MIT Press, Cam-
bridge, MA.
26 Li, Granados, Netessine: Are Consumers Strategic?
Table 1 Summary Statistics of Demand and Price
mean std min max
total passengers by market departure date 90.1 110.0 0 1436
weekly passengers 6.4 13.3 0 309
weekly average fare (weighted)($) 370.35 288.58 110.33 4284.33
Table 2 Fare Fluctuations over Markets/Departure Dates/Booking Time
decrease(fraction) no change(fraction) increase(fraction)
daily lowest fare
mean 0.279 0.472 0.249
weekly fare (average of daily lowest fare)
mean 0.395 0.093 0.512
range by market [0.170, 0.561] [0.004, 0.363] [0.322, 0.630]
range by departure date [0.300, 0.477] [0.042, 0.153] [0.408, 0.644]
by booking week 1 0.450† 0.175 0.375
2 0.499 0.135 0.367
3 0.474 0.138 0.388
4 0.413 0.133 0.454
5 0.449 0.106 0.445
6 0.435 0.084 0.481
7 0.446 0.071 0.483
8 0.425 0.076 0.499
9 0.460 0.080 0.460
10 0.456 0.073 0.471
11 0.198 0.035 0.767
12 0.035 0.006 0.959
† : Fare decreases with 0.450 probability from week 1 to week 2.
Table 3 Variable Descriptions
Category Variable
(1) Reduced-Form Regressions and Baseline Demand Model
price weekly price: average of daily lowest prices within a week
booking time polynomials of booking week; final booking week dummy before departure
departure date characteristics high-demand season; day-of-week dummies
(2) Predicting the Probability of Prices Falling for Weak-Form Rational Expectation
relative prices current to last: current week price divided by final week price
current to initial: current week price divided by the first week price
current to mktavg: current week price divided by the average market price
price volatility the coefficient of variance of the daily prices in the current week
initial price initial price
other measures booking time and departure day characteristics
(3) Supply Model, Strong-Form Rational Expectation
price history price lagged by one period
demand history cumulative demand
initial price initial price
other measures booking time and departure day characteristics
Li, Granados, Netessine: Are Consumers Strategic? 27
Table 4 Reduced-Form Regressions of Demand on (Expected) Future and Past Prices
(1) (2) (3)
current price realized future expected prices
and past prices










booking time t 4.224 -1.187 9.783
(2.695) (2.748) (4.762)
t2 -0.985 0.147 -1.834
(0.472) (0.491) (0.921)
t3 0.088 0.022 0.122
(0.024) (0.026) (0.050)
final week 25.113 84.738 145.341
(5.222) (12.166) (17.367)
high season 4.450 3.419 5.875
(2.102) (2.050) (2.358)
day-of-week dummies yes yes yes
const 8.740 8.893 -16.116
(6.681) (7.287) (8.989)
R-square 0.7300 0.7466 0.7554
Note: Standard errors are shown in parentheses.
Table 5 Compare Different Baseline Demand Models (perfect foresight): Market L
(1) (2) (3)
linear linear + fixed nonlinear
effect + AR1
fraction 0.036 0.052 0.025
95% confidence interval [0.000, 0.114] [0.001, 0.122] [0.000, 0.112]
price -0.174 -0.224 -0.005
(0.038) (0.031) (0.001)
booking time t -0.107 -10.293 0.196
(3.300) (3.611) (0.136)
t2 0.811 2.252 -0.003
(0.572) (0.618) (0.025)
t3 -0.047 -0.109 0.000
(0.028) (0.030) (0.001)
final week 8.695 16.266 0.234
(4.063) (4.201) (0.106)
high season 46.345 1.159
(11.125) (0.324)





R-square 0.2470 0.3937 0.2478
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Table 6 Results under Different Consumer Expectation Assumptions: Market L
(1) (2) (3)
perfect strong-form weak-form
foresight rational expectation rational expectation
fraction of strategic consumers 0.052 0.292 0.385
95% confidence interval [0.001, 0.122] [0.151, 0.541] [0.198, 0.394]
price -0.224 -0.224 -0.214
(0.031) (0.032) (0.031)
booking time t -10.293 -10.160 -6.814
(3.611) (3.612) (3.542)
t2 2.252 2.328 1.781
(0.618) (0.619) (0.598)
t3 -0.109 -0.117 -0.091
(0.030) (0.030) (0.029)
final week 16.266 20.340 17.263
(4.201) (4.856) (4.416)
AR1(ρ) 0.117 0.033 0.045
(0.064) (0.073) (0.080)
R-square 0.3937 0.4073 0.4215
Table 7 Allowing for Different Price Sensitivities between Myopic and Strategic Consumers
Market L Market B
perfect strong-form weak-form perfect strong-form weak-form
foresight rational rational foresight rational rational
fraction (θ) 0.094 0.275 0.378 0.107 0.186 0.120
95% confidence interval [0.008, 0.182] [0.106, 0.391] [0.158, 0.548] [0.002, 0.201] [0.004, 0.367] [0.007, 0.250]
observed fraction (θobs) 0.038 0.286 0.351 0.036 0.048 0.026
95% confidence interval [0.004, 0.097] [0.127, 0.435] [0.174, 0.511] [0.000, 0.093] [0.000, 0.142] [0.000, 0.105]
price
non-strategic (βn) -0.228 -0.229 -0.216 -0.013 -0.024 -0.026
(0.032) (0.031) (0.030) (0.032) (0.017) (0.016)
strategic(βs) -0.311 -0.187 -0.206 -0.131 -0.201 -0.341
(0.335) (0.125) (0.066) (0.364) (0.392) (0.510)
booking time t -9.773 -10.332 -6.805 6.365 4.474 4.285
(3.609) (3.745) (3.243) (2.135) (1.476) (1.354)
t2 2.169 2.354 1.778 -1.219 -0.986 -0.971
(0.622) (0.640) (0.562) (0.335) (0.254) (0.241)
t3 -0.105 -0.118 -0.091 0.085 0.077 0.077
(0.031) (0.031) (0.028) (0.017) (0.013) (0.013)
final week 13.219 22.111 17.378 2.951 2.341 2.643
(5.077) (6.808) (6.358) (4.969) (4.745) (4.705)
const 0.094 0.044 0.050 0.488 0.572 0.587
(0.062) (0.063) (0.074) (0.102) (0.065) (0.059)
R-square 0.3951 0.4076 0.4216 0.5965 0.6090 0.6108
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Table 8 Fraction of Strategic Consumers over All Markets (strong-form rational expectation)
fraction same price different price
sensitivities sensitivities
average (std) 0.243 (0.126) 0.171 (0.112)
range [0.023, 0.514] [0.003, 0.567]
[5th percentile, 95th percentile] [0.049, 0.449] [0.022, 0.368]
# of significant estimates 51 57
total # of markets 111 111
histogram
Table 9 Explaining Strategic Behavior Using Market Characteristics
same price elasticities different price elasticities




low cost carrier market share -0.033 -0.170
(0.792) (0.822)
% of tickets distributed online 1.490* 1.443
(0.845) (0.877)




ln(origin population) 0.162 0.079
(0.137) (0.142)
ln(origin per capita income) 1.386* 1.652**
(0.724) (0.751)




# of obs (# of markets) 111 111
R-square 0.2372 0.2026
**:p-value< 0.05;*:p-value< 0.1
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Table 10 Counterfactual Analysis
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)= (3)-(1) (6)=(4)-(2)
daily all all monotone strategic gains from
myopic current strategic price - myopic monotone price
Market L (leisure)
perfect revenue ($1,000) 102.2 102.45 103.62 98.71 1.39% (0.16%) -3.66% (0.43%)
foresight demand (# of pax) 405.66 407.09 423.36 356.39 4.36% -12.45%
weighted price ($) 252.02 251.75 244.84 277.04 -2.85% 10.06%
price ($) 242.97 243.03 242.19 261.1 -0.32% 7.44%
strong-form revenue ($1,000) 104.99 104.88 105.22 102.34 0.22% (0.08%) -2.42% (0.36%)
rational demand (# of pax) 414.25 414.11 417.88 368.61 0.88% -10.98%
expectation weighted price ($) 253.51 253.34 251.87 277.71 -0.65% 9.63%
price ($) 243.79 243.59 241.77 261.46 -0.83% 7.34%
Market B (business)
perfect revenue ($1,000) 55.359 55.377 54.801 56.954 -1.01%(0.19%) 2.85%(0.34%)
foresight demand (# of pax) 197.61 197.77 200.75 190.71 1.59% -3.58%
weighted price ($) 280.14 280 273 298.65 -2.55% 6.67%
price ($) 239.69 239.69 238.92 260.97 -0.32% 8.88%
strong-form revenue ($1,000) 55.601 55.59 55.377 57.585 -0.40%(0.11%) 3.59%(0.39%)
rational demand (# of pax) 198.41 198.48 199.03 193.18 0.31% -2.68%
expectation weighted price ($) 280.2 280.05 278.2 298.09 -0.71% 6.45%
price ($) 239.85 239.76 238.71 260.86 -0.48% 8.80%
Note: Standard deviations are shown in parentheses.
Table 11 Counterfactual Analysis Summarized across All Markets
revenue change (strategic - myopic) revenue gains from monotone price
perfect rational Exp. perfect rational exp.
foresight (strong-form) foresight (strong-form)
percentile
5% -2.7% -1.0% -1.4% -1.1%
50% -0.8% -0.1% 2.8% 3.1%
95% 1.0% 0.8% 9.2% 10.6%
mean -0.9% -0.1% 3.4% 3.6%
std 1.1% 0.5% 3.6% 3.5%
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Appendix A: Estimation under Fixed-Effect and Serial Correlation
To estimate the model with fixed effects and serial correlation in the baseline demand, we apply the following
transformation. For simplicity of illustration, in the following discussion we assume a constant fraction of
strategic consumers and the same price sensitivity for both non-strategic and strategic consumers. Similar
logic can easily be applied to more complicated models. In the demand model, let Xmt represent market-
departure date characteristics Xm, polynomials of booking time t and the constant
dmt = (1− θzmt)
(−βpmt +Xmtδ+ εmt)+ θzm,t−1(−βpmt +Xm,t−1δ+ εm,t−1)
εmt = µm + mt,
mt = ρm,t−1 + νmt.
The demand model can also be written as
dmt = dˆmt + (1− θzmt)νmt,
dˆmt = (1− θzmt)
(−βpmt +Xmtδ+ ρεm,t−1)+ θzm,t−1(−βpmt +Xm,t−1δ+ εm,t−1)
Note that previously realized demand shock εm,t−1 can be used to predict demand dˆmt once it is estimated
from the previously realized demand dm,t−1.

















2νˆ2mt, while allowing for possible price endogeneity. Price pmt can be correlated with µm. Meanwhile,
price pmt can also be correlated with εmt through correlation with εm,t−1.
To estimate the model, the general idea is to transform the nonlinear problem to a linear problem — the
traditional panel data problem with fixed effect and serial correlation. First, move price to the left-hand side
in the demand model, and the right-hand side can be written as the the multiplication of a transformation
matrix Z(θ) and a column vector









d+β(1− θz+ θlagz)p = Z(θ)(Xδ+µ+ ),
Z−1(θ)
(
d+β(1− θz+ θlagz)p) = Xδ+µ+ ,
where lagz is z lagged by one period of time. Let d˜mt(θ,β) denote the left-hand side. Since
d˜mt(θ,β) = Xmtδ+µm + mt =Xmtδ+µm + ρm,t−1 + νmt,
d˜m,t−1(θ,β) = Xm,t−1δ+µm + m,t−1.
Take partial difference to remove serial correlation,
d˜mt(θ,β)− ρd˜m,t−1(θ,β) = (Xmt− ρXm,t−1)δ+ (1− ρ)µm + νmt, (7)
˜˜
dmt(θ,β, ρ) = X˜mt(ρ)δ+ µ˜m(ρ) + νmt. (8)
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dm·(θ,β, ρ) = (X˜mt(ρ)− ¯˜Xm·(ρ))δ+ νmt− ν¯m·, (9)




¯˜Xm·, and ν¯ represent the average of corresponding variables across time t.
Now, given any (θ,β, ρ), we are be able to obtain an unbiased estimate of δ using OLS estimator. The sum
of squares, i.e.
∑
(1− θzmt)2νˆ2mt, can be calculated as follows,
1. For any given (θ,β, ρ), compute d˙mt, X˙mt.
2. Compute the OLS estimator of δ in Equation 10; denote as δˆ.
3. Compute estimates of residuals in Equation 8, ˆ˜µm + νˆmt =
˜˜
dmt(θ,β, ρ)− X˜mtδˆ.
4. Estimate transformed fixed effect ˆ˜µm using the average of estimated residuals obtained in step 3.
Calculate νˆmt subsequently.
5. Compute sum of squares(θ,β, ρ) =
∑
(1− θzmt)2νˆ2mt.
The nonlinear least square procedure is applied to find the optimal (θ,β, ρ) that minimizes
sum of squares(θ,β, ρ). One additional comment about the initial observation, since we take partial differ-
ence in the model, the degree of freedom decreases by one within each group, i.e., market-departure-date.
Simply omitting the first observation is likely to cause inefficiency when the number of groups is small, i.e.,
45 departure dates in each market. We apply Prais-Winsten transformation to the first observation in each
group, i.e. multiply by the first error term by
√
1− ρ2.
Appendix B: Additional Table
Table 12 Prediction Models for Weak- and Strong-Form Rational Expectations: Market L
Weak-Form Rational Exp. Strong-Form Rational Exp.
Probit Model Pr(Pt + 1< pt) Supply Model
current to last -0.035 Pricet−1 0.924
(0.732) (0.033)
current to inital 10.818 cumulative demandt−1 0.046
(2.819) (0.059)




initial price 0.041 initial price 0.043
(0.013) (0.011)
t -0.580 t 6.186
(0.216) (0.055)
t2 0.127 t2 -1.382
(0.039) (0.946)




high season -1.070 high season 10.699
(0.325) (5.450)
day-of-week dummies yes day-of-week dummies yes
const -12.190 const -3.255
(3.381) (16.176)
pseudo R-square 0.1729 R-square 0.8751
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